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7.1 Introduction 
There is general agreement on the difference, in terms of efficiency, between small 
firms in southern and northern Italy (see Prosperetti and Varetto, 1991; Giannola 
and Sarno, 1996; Giannola, Papagni and Sarno, 1998; Sarno, 1999). As far as 
technical efficiency is concerned (that is the ability to generate output from a given 
amount of factors of production) there appears, over the years, a persistent, huge 
differential (around 30 per cent) in favour of Northern firms. These findings 
(Giannola and Sarno, 1996; Giannola, Sarno and Papagni, 1998) show that 
Southern firms are not in a position to exploit economies of scale as northern firms 
do. The fact that firms’ size in the Mezzogiorno, for different size classes, is 
systematically smaller than in the rest of Italy, is a particular feature that seems to 
have major consequences. 
When the analysis shifts from technical to economic efficiency (i.e., the ability 
to combine the factors of production so as to equalize the weighted marginal 
productivity of factors), the gap between southern and northern firms in the level 
of production costs is dramatically reduced (ranging from 6 to 10 per cent). These 
results suggest that the North-South gap is not so much related to a specific 
inefficiency, but to the smaller size of southern firms that does not allow them to 
profit from returns to scale to the same extent. 
A possible conclusion (with relevant policy implications) is that the root of 
many problems of southern firms lies in the obstacles that prevent them from 
growing to reach an adequate operating size. A related implication is that the 
southern industrial structure, due to its size characteristics, is more easily affected 
by monetary policy and the economic cycle (Gertler and Gilchrist, 1991; 1993) 
The difficulties faced by southern firms become evident if we look at the 
evolution of the Italian manufacturing industry during the 1990s. For this purpose, 
we can proceed by considering a sample of firms which is representative of the 
entire population from a sectoral, dimensional and geographical standpoint. During 
the 1990s there was an overall decline in average firm size in Italian across all size 
classes. This is particularly marked for southern firms, in which firms’ size in 1990 
was already significantly below average; by 1994 this character was considerably 
114 Money Credit and the Role of the State 
accentuated and was confirmed in 1997; by contrast, average northern Italian firm 
size showed a major increase in 1997. 
Moreover, the less pronounced and less persistent decline of the average size 
did not prevent Northern firms from expanding sales in the period in hand; this is 
due to the rapid growth of exports that followed the 1992 devaluation of the Italian 
lira. In the same period, in the Mezzogiorno, sales of local firms show a persistent 
and significant decline. As a consequence, the dynamics of the productivity of 
labour was negative (or stagnant) in the South, while it steadily grew in the rest of 
the country. 
Southern firms, while experiencing at the end of the period some significant 
progress in penetrating foreign markets, faced increased competition on the 
domestic market due to the contraction in aggregate demand, severely affected by 
the restrictive stance of the macroeconomic policy. 
All in all, these data illustrate the weakness (if not the worsening) of the 
competitive position of manufacturing firms in the South. 
 
 
7.2 Productive and Financial Performance, the Pace of Capital 
Accumulation and the Emergence of Financial Constraints 
The problems of southern firms are clearly expressed by their relative performance 
(tables 1a and 1b; notice that in the following analysis all the data are drawn from 
Medio Credito Centrale, 1999). Profitability ratios, such as ROE and ROI, show a 
negative evolution after 1992. This evolution has both a real and a financial 
explanation. We notice the relative decline in factor productivity that accompanies 
the reduction in the operative scale of the firms. This trend can be seen (in general 
and especially by firm size) considering several ratios like the per capita value 
added; fixed assets per employee, sales/fixed assets ratios. At the same time, there 
is a sharp increase in financial costs or, in general, a problematic adjustment of the 
‘‘financial framework’’ that emerges from the inspection of other ratios like total 
financial debt/sales; the burden of debt/value added and burden of debt/ gross 
operating margin. Also in this case the firms with fewer than 50 employees show 
the most problematic performance. 
Looking at the real factors, both northern and southern firms show a decline in 
the value added as a share of sales and an increase in the labour cost/value added 
ratio. 
The labour cost per employee is stable in the South, while it is slightly 
increasing for northern firms. Therefore the increasing weight of the labour cost 
per unit of value added recorded in the South is due to the inadequate dynamics of 
value added as well as to the decline in sales. These compound ‘scale effects’ 
negatively affect the gross margin of these firms, which suffers a further reduction 
due to the increased financial costs. For this last aspect – which will be analyzed in 
greater detail below – it must be said that increasing costs go hand-in-hand with a 
recovery of investment activity. Therefore the worsening of the financial situation 
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might be described as temporary, inasmuch as it is the necessary condition for 
implementing a strategy aimed to recover competitiveness. However, it must also 
be said that – per se – the decline in sales and size is a powerful factor in 
determining, ceteris paribus, an increasing financial burden for southern firms. In 
this case the concern of maintaining the financial equilibrium may actually offset 
crucial investment processes (and this seems to apply particularly to smaller firms). 
 
Table 7.1a Performance and structural ratios (median values) b 
 
 
MEZZOGIORNO 
 1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 
ROE 4.2 4.2 4.4 4.9 4.8 
ROI 9.6 7.8 9.4 9.8 8.0 
OF/DFT 
OF/MOL 
OF/VA 
VA/FATT 
W/VA 
VA/ADD 
FATT/IMM 
IMM/ADD  
W/ADD 
DFT/FAT  
17.8 
41.8 
16.7 
32.6 
63.7 
57.0 
379.6 
53.2 
 35,9 
27.7 
13.8  
29.7 
12.1 
32.8 
66.6 
52.9 
368. 
49.6 
34,2 
 22.8 
14.1 
37.9 
 14.2 
25,9 
 59.2 
67.7 
408.2 
67.8 
39.7 
18,6  
13.2 
36.4 
13.6 
26.5 
61.7 
64.8 
394.1 
65.1 
39.6 
19.7  
11.3 
31.6 
11.7 
27,1 
63.7 
65.8 
394.4 
66,5 
41,9 
21.6 
 CENTER NORTH 
 1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 
ROE 
ROI 
OF/DFT 
OF/MOL 
OF/VA 
VA/FATT 
W/VA 
VA/ADD 
FATT/IMM 
IMM/ADD  
W/ADD 
DFT/FAT 
5.7 
11.1 
18.2 
45.6 
14.2 
 33.3 
 69.4 
 67.1 
 553. 
 37.1 
 46.4 
 23.2 
13.0 
 13.7 
13.8  
28.4  
9.9 
33.6 
66.6 
72.9 
606.4 
38.1 
48.5 
18.3 
17.4 
 19.0 
15.6 
29.0 
11.4 
27.8 
59.2 
86.6 
678.4 
7.1 
50.6 
15.0 
13.8 
16.3 
13.7 
30.7 
10.6 
28.4 
64,1 
79,0 
648,7 
45,0 
50,4 
13,7 
12,2 
13,4 
10.9 
27.7 
9,1 
28,4 
66,2 
81,0 
651.0 
47.8 
52.9 
15.0 
b
 See Legenda 
Source: Mediocredito Centrale 
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Table 7.1b Performance and structural ratios. by dimensional classes 
(median values) b 
 
  MEZZOGIORNO 
 < 50 51-250 251-500 
 1992 1995 1997 1992 1995 1997 1992 1995 1997 
          
ROE 5.7 3.9  4.7 0.7 4.6 4.9 0.4 7.4 6.3 
ROI 11.2 10.1  8.4 5.5 8.5 6.8 5.1 7.3 6,6 
VA/FATT 33.5 23.4 25.9 33,2 28.4 29.4 31,2 33,7 27.1 
MOL/VA 35.2 44.5 38.6  32.4 35,4 31,4 28.5 40.0 31.0 
OF/VA 
OF/MOL 
14.8 
32.4 
 15.9 
39.7 
12.3 
33.3 
15,7 
47,0 
13.2 
34.0 
10.7 
30.7 
11.3 
42.3 
16.0 
54.4 
10.6 
30.4 
DFT/FATT 
VA/ADD 
W/ADD 
14.9 
47.8 
31.0 
17.3 
71.9 
38.7 
20.1 
65.5 
40.3 
32.1 
57.7 
38.0 
20,5 
61.4 
39.7 
22.1 
65.7 
45.5 
32.1 
74.9 
43.2 
32.7 
67.7 
44.4 
31.3 
68.5 
52.4 
 CENTER NORTH 
 < 50 51-250 251-500 
 1992 1995 1997 1992 1995 1997 1992 1995 1997 
          
ROE 10.2 18.7 13.0 6.0 16.3 11.2 4.0 16.3 12.0 
ROI 18.4 23.6 16.1 11.4 16.4 10.6 7.9 12.7 9.9 
VA/FATT 34.2 24.4 26.2 35.5 31.7 31,6 33.9 31.7 31.2 
MOL/VA 35.6 44.2 34.7 30.8 37.3 32.6 30.9 37.4 33.6 
OF/VA 
OF/MOL 
12.3 
35.4 
12.2 
30.1 
9,5 
28.9 
12.7 
40,0 
10.7 
26.8 
8.6 
26,7 
14.6 
47.9 
10.8 
31.8 
8.3 
26.4 
DFT/FATT 
VA/ADD 
W/ADD 
12.0 
61.6 
41.1 
10.4 
89.2 
48.5 
8.3 
77.0 
49.8 
24.2 
70.7 
49.1 
20.3 
83.6 
52.5 
23.2 
84.5 
56.3 
32.0 
74.2 
50.3 
23.6 
89.9 
56.7 
25.5 
91.5 
61.8 
          
b
 See Legenda 
Source: Mediocredito Centrale 
 
 
7.3  Financing Investments 
Faced by increasing difficulties, southern firms showed an interesting reaction 
which led to a recovery of the pace of investment in the last three years analysed 
(1995-97) (Table 7.2). 57 per cent of these investments are in innovative 
equipment (against 36 per cent in the North).  
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Table 7.2 Fixed investments (per cent on sales) 
 
 SOUTH NORTH 
 1992 1993 1994 1992 1993 1994 
< 50 employees 3,3 2,8 2,9 4,0 12,2 4,9 
51-250 employees 5,6 6,5 6,2 3,5 4,3 2,7 
251-500 employees 4,2 4,3 2,7 4,3 3,6 3,6 
TOTAL  5.9 5,4 4,8 3,9 5,1 3,2 
 1995 1996 1997 1995 1996 1997 
< 50 employees 9.0 5.9 9.4 10.8 11,2 11.1 
51-250 employees 4.6 5.1 6,9 4.8 4,6 4.6 
251-500 employees 4.5 5.4 6.2 4,5 4.0 3.8 
TOTAL 5.8 5,4 7.4 6.2 6.0 6.0 
Source: Mediocredito Centrale 
 
It is worth pointing out two key aspects in this process. While in the period 
1992–94, capital accumulation is mainly concentrated in the firms belonging to the 
51–250 class of employees, and is particularly weak for firms with fewer than 51 
employees, in the last period (1995–97) small firms show significant activism 
nationwide. As far as southern firms are concerned, both innovation and 
investment are concentrated in non-exporting firms, i.e., those that have been most 
affected by increasing competition in the domestic market. 
In terms of the source of finance for investments, Table 7.3 gives such 
information as well as (last row) information on the share of firms rationed on the 
credit market. Considering all firms, we see that in the 1992–1994 period, internal 
contribution, via retained profits, and additional equity capital are far less 
substantial sources of finance in the South (46 per cent) than in the North (64 per 
cent). Public subsidies (capital grants) and subsidized medium long term loans, 
instead, account for 18 and 21 per cent respectively in the South, against the 2 and 
12 per cent in the North. On the contrary, non-subsidized loans (ordinary credit) 
contribute much less (5 per cent against 11 per cent) as well as other financial 
instruments like leasing (5 per cent against 8 per cent). 
Interestingly enough, these general characteristics do not apply in that period to 
southern firms with fewer than 51 employees, or – for relevant aspects – to the 
class of 51-250 employees. In fact, for smaller firms the main source of finance is 
represented by self-finance (54 per cent), quite unlike the situation in the North (26 
per cent). As regards the contribution of equity capital, we end up with 56 per cent 
in the South and 27 per cent in the North. In addition, subsidized medium long 
terms loans are a more substantial source of finance for northern firms up to 250 
employees.1 As for the percentage of rationed firms, this is at least double in the 
South for each size class. 
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Table 7.3 Sources of company finance (per cent) 
 
 
< 50 51-250 251-500 
 SOUTH NORTH SOUTH NORTH SOUTH NORTH 
Venture capital 1.8 0.7 0.3 2.2 0.2 2.7 
Self-financing 53.7 25.8 47.1 57.3 45.8 63.7 
Ordinary loans 1.2 3.8 3.5 10.0 2.2 12.9 
 
Special loans 5.3 7.6 18.5 19.2 28.3 11.1 
Public subsidies 19.1 0.8 20.8 2.0 16.8 2.6 
Leasing 18.2 60.3 6.7 7.1 5.3 2.8 
Tax concessions 0.5 0.9 1.6 1.5 1.3 0.7 
Other 0.4 0.1 1.5 0.7 0.1 3.5 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Rationed firms (%) 10.5 5.4 10.6 4.3 7.2 4.9 
       
 < 50 51-250 251-500 
 SOUTH NORTH SOUTH NORTH SOUTH NORTH 
Venture capital 1.0 0.4 1.7 2.6 11.1 1.6 
Self-financing 21.3 67.3  53.3 41.3 51.3 58.2 
Ordinary loans 5.3 12.1 7.5 19.1 5.9 22.0 
 
Special loans 4.9 4.1 5.0 7.8 11.1 3.7 
Public subsidies 12.2 1.5 13.9 4.7 18.2 1.4 
Leasing 51.2 9.3 14.6 7.8 1.6 2.1 
Other 0.1 2.0 0.4 1.9 0.5 3.2 
TOTAL 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Rationed firms (%) 10.5 5.4 10.6 4.3 7.2 4.9 
 
In the 1995–1997 period smaller firms are most dynamic (especially in the 
North) in terms of investment. The share of equity and retained profits is 
confirmed as the main source of finance in the North especially for smaller firms. 
In the South, this source is confirmed as the most important only for firms with 
over 50 employees; the second most important source of finance consists of grants, 
fiscal and interest incentives. Smaller firms are not in a position to meet the need to 
finance a larger investment by retained profits. This source is much less important 
than in the past in this period and more limited in absolute terms. southern firms 
with under 51 employees find their main source of finance in instruments – like 
leasing – that at the same time do not dramatically affect their liquidity position 
and do not entail a need for an ‘excessive’ increase in the amount of bank credit. In 
this respect the marginal role of ordinary credit in the South is confirmed in 
general and especially for smaller firms; the opposite occurs in the rest of the 
country.  
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7.4 Characteristics of the Financial Constraint 
This evidence suggests that binding financial constraints may considerably affect 
investment performance of southern firms with fewer than 51 employees. In 
particular, further inspection of the data seems to support the idea that such firms 
face an atypical liquidity constraint, which limits an adequate flow of working 
capital and hence expansion even in a profitable business environment (as in the 
period from 1995–1997). Vice versa, in the next size class (51-250 employees) the 
financial constraint takes the more traditional form of a difficulty in funding fixed 
capital investment. In general, for all firms, the persistence of a more severe 
financial constraint in the Mezzogiorno than in the rest of Italy is confirmed. 
Table 7.1 shows that the debt/sales ratio is substantially higher in the South and 
is increasing markedly in small firms. The same is true for the ratio between 
financial costs (interest costs) and gross operating margin. These results are 
connected to the pronounced restriction of the operative scale of southern firms 
(Iuzzolino, 1999). In the same period the share of bank loans on total sales is 
falling. Within the total of bank loans, the share of short term loans is also falling, 
at a rate that is particularly evident in southern Italy. 
Taking into account the size of firms (Table 7.5), the increase in the debt 
burden affects mainly the first two size classes. Small firms try with some success 
to reduce the share of bank loans on sales, but they are much less successful in 
reducing short term bank debt. For medium sized firms, instead, the growth of the 
financial debt is accompanied by a more stable share of bank loans on total debt 
and by a substantial reduction of its short term component. But the worst signs for 
small southern firms are represented by the explosion of two crucial indicators 
such as total financial debt / sales, and burden of debt / value added ratios. For 
northern firms the increase in total debt is much less pronounced; the share of bank 
debt remains almost stable and all major financial ratios are under control. 
The common tendency in the South is debt restructuring which – especially for 
small and medium sized firms - aims to reduce financial needs arising from the 
production process: a target that small firms seem to achieve with increasing 
difficulty and that – as will be argued in the next section – sets the pace of their 
activity. To confirm this conjecture, this trend is accompanied by a greater 
attention of small southern firms to their liquidity position (Table 7.4 shows how 
the current assets / sales and current assets / current liabilities ratios are, in the 
Mezzogiorno, higher than in the North). 
This suggests that, in the period considered, the difficulty coping with 
increasing competition compels Southern firms to control their financial 
equilibrium. Greater concern with company liquidity is combined with an effort to 
reduce dependence on the banking system. 
The adjustment of the debt structure, that follows the decline of the operative 
scale, delivers some short term results in tackling the growth of the financial 
burden. However, it poses further constraints on firms’ ability to grow and to  
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Table 7.4 Debt and liquidity ratiosb 
 
 SOUTH 
  1992  1994  1995  1996  1997 
DFT/CAP 79.4 57.0 65.3  63.0 61.6 
DFT/FATT 27.7 22.8 18.6  19.7 21.6 
BNCB/BNC 
OF/DFT 
LIQUIDC 
OF/VA 
ATTC/FATT 
92.3 
20.3 
124.9 
16.7 
70.5 
95.1 
17.5 
121.5 
12.1 
70.1 
85.8 
15.4 
 124.9 
14.2 
66.1 
77.1 
15,4 
 123.8 
13.6 
65.7 
80.6 
14,0 
 127.3 
 11.7 
67,5 
 NORTH 
 1992 1994 1995 1996 1997 
DFT/CAP 112.9 91.7 87.7 68.4 74.1 
DFT/FATT 23.2 18.3 15.0 13.7 15.0 
BNCB/BNC 91.4 94.6 90.9 89.2 86.8 
OF/DFT 21.4 16.0 17.3 15.6 12.6 
LIQUIDC 122.7 120.7 118.8 117.7 117.7 
OF/VA 14.2 9.9 11.4 10.6 9.1 
ATTC/FATT 61.2 61.0 55.9 54.7 57.3 
b
 See following LEGENDA 
Source: Mediocredito Centrale data 
 
pursue a suitable investment policy. In this perspective, decline in competitiveness 
and financial fragility become strictly interconnected and self-maintaining 
phenomena. Moreover, there is also a negative effect on the perceived riskiness of 
the firms, with the result of making the flow of short term funds more uncertain, 
and making rationing of long term finance more likely to happen. Hence, firms – 
especially small ones – are increasingly concerned with liquidity constraints and 
are more compelled (often unsuccessfully) to resort to retained profits to meet their 
financial needs. 
 
 
7.5 The Financial-Liquidity Constraint; a Simple Model and Some 
Macroeconomic Implications 
It is now possible to propose a very simple framework which suggests how 
decisive the liquidity constraint may be in directly conditioning firms’ production 
decisions as well as – in turn – the process of investment. 
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Table 7.5 Debt and liquidity ratios for size classesb 
 
 SOUTH 
 < 50 51-250 251-500 
 1990 1992 1994 1990 1992 1994 1990 1992 1994 
OF/MOL 42,8 50,0 56,6 18,7 21,6 17,9 10,7 21,4 8,7 
DFT/CAP 87,1 93,8 101,9 98,1 94,3 100,4 83,7 138,4 108,7 
DFT/FATT 27,0 27,7 32,0 34,4 38,5 39,2 27,2 40,0 37,2 
BNC/DFT 94,7 94,7 82,6 93,6 81,8 79,9 86,0 82,1 84,9 
BNCB/BNC 97,1 97,8 93,4 94,2 85,9 82,9 97,6 69,6 81,3 
LIQUIDC 1,3 1,3 1,2 1,4 1,4 1,3 1,9 1,9 1,7 
ATTC/FATT 60,3 64,7 69,2 69,4 80,6 75,0 85,8 86,8 88,8 
GESTFIN 23,9 10,5 –16,9 23,9 –10,0 -83,1 31,3 5,0 8,4 
 NORTH 
 < 50 51-250 251-500 
 1990 1992 1994 1990 1992 1994 1990 1992 1994 
          
OF/MOL 36,6 49,9 32,5 40,3 55,9 36,6 43,2 60,7 40,8 
DFT/CAP 108,7 123,9 124,9 118,9 114,9 116,1 115,6 131,0 110,7 
DFT/FATT 21,5 26,6 25,5 27,5 29,0 26,7 26,4 34,7 28,7 
BNC/DFT 93,7 88,2 92,4 87,1 85,1 84,6 83,8 74,9 79,4 
BNCB/BNC 98,9 94,2 92,4 90,8 90,8 90,0 85,5 80,4 83,4 
LIQUIDC 1,3 1,2 1,3 1,3 1,2 1,2 1,2 1,1 1,2 
ATTC/FATT 58,1 61,1 60,7 64,7 66,3 63,1 60,3 73,9 72,4 
GESTFIN 23,4 4,2 20,9 20,3 –1,1 21,5 25,9 -8,6 5,2 
          
 
b
 See following LEGENDA 
Source: Elaborations on Mediocredito Centrale’s data 
 
Let us assume that a firm resorts to debt, d, to finance its activity, y, according 
to a fixed proportion α. Let δ be the planned rate of growth of production. The 
demand for debt per unit of time will be: 
 
 ∆d = δd
–1 =αδy–1 (5.1) 
 
Assume that the supply of debt follows the rule: 
 
 ∆d = δd
–1 – f (5.2) 
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where f represents a function that takes into account the risk level of the firm. For 
the sake of simplicity, suppose f is a function of the total amount of a firm’s debt d 
and of the ‘own – capital’ E (equity) that plays the role of a sort of collateral in 
order to moderate the firm’s risk. We therefore define µE as a bonus whose value 
is a direct proportion of the level of firms’ capital E and (through the value of 
0 < µ < 1 exogenously determined) inversely related to the general conditions of 
risk (of the sector, the environment, etc.). The specific risk of the firm is relate to d 
and to the parameter γ. The structure of f is therefore defined by 
 
  f = –µE + γd (5.3) 
 
This expression defines a critical level of d as a function of µ and γ and E, 
d* = µE/γ, for which f = 0. For d ≤ µE/γ, then, f ≤ 0 and the supply of loans is 
equal to, or greater than the demand. In this case the firm does not face a liquidity 
constraint; the planned growth of production is compatible with the available 
financial resources. In the opposite case (when d > d*), the availability of external 
resources falls progressively as d increases. In this case the available resources are 
less than the amount needed to finance the planned growth. 
 Substituting (5.3) in (5.2) we have a first order difference equation: 
 
 
-1
1
1 1
Ed d µ+ δ − = + γ + γ   (5.4) 
 
For given initial conditions and with γ ≠ δ, the solution will be: 
 
 
0 1
1
t
t
d E Ed − µ µ  + δ = +  γ − δ + γ γ − δ     
 
The debt grows over time in proportion that depends on h = (1 + δ)/(1 + γ). 
When δ < γ, h < 1, d converges to µE/(γ − δ); credit rationing prevails. The greater 
the difference between δ and γ, the faster is the convergence. If δ > γ; h > 1; the 
liquidity constraint may or may not limit the desired growth according to the size 
of firms’ capital E. When E > d0 [(1 + δ)t (1 + γ)t –1]/(γ − δ)/µ there is no constraint 
in financing the planned growth of production.  
Since we assumed a constant relationship between d and y, the growth profile 
of y coincides with that of d. When δ < γ, y converges to the equilibrium value 
µE/α(γ − δ) which is inversely related to α which, in turn, represents the measure 
of the dependence of firm production from external finance. 
 
 
7.6 Conclusions 
In my opinion this simple model sheds some light on the nature of the financial 
constraint which is particularly relevant to the idiosyncratic position of southern 
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Italian firms. But, apart from the Italian Mezzogiorno, this simple framework may 
apply to a more general perspective (Whited, 1992).  
The idea is that, rather than the lack of finance for investment projects (the 
main interest of the ‘rationing literature’ (Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1980; 
Bond, Meghir, 1994) it is worth investigating a hierarchical and – in my opinion – 
more severe constraint. This deals with the delicate phase represented by the 
opening of the monetary circuit. And, since it negatively affects the possibility to 
provide the necessary working capital, it also affects current production, firms’ 
size and – in perspective – investment decisions. 
As for the Italian Mezzogiorno, the microstructural features outlined above lead 
to some major macroeconomic implications. The fact that the effective d values are 
conditioned by a liquidity constraint, combined with the assumed relationship 
between debt and the level of sales, indicates that, at the aggregate level, national 
income will also be constrained. More specifically, even if the liquidity constraint 
does not affect the rate of growth, it will certainly affect the level of the national 
product. 
 
 
APPENDIX 
LEGENDA: RATIOS 
  
OF/DFT Burden of debt/Total financial debt 
OF/MOL Burden of debt/Gross operating margin 
OF/VA Burden of debt/Value added 
VA/FATT Value added/Sales 
VA/ADD Value added/Employees 
W/VA Labour cost/Employees 
MOL/VA Gross operating margin/Value added 
W/ADD Labour cost/Employees 
IMM/ADD  Fixed assets/Employees 
  
ROI Return on investment 
ROE Return on equity 
  
DFT/CAP Total financial debt/Equity 
DFT/FATT Total financial debt/Sales 
  
BNCB/BNC Short-term bank debt/Total bank debt 
  
LIQUIDIC Current assets/Current liabilities 
  
GESTFIN Net income/Gross operating income 
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Note 
 
1  In the period under consideration, capital grants are still reserved by law almost 
exclusively for the realization of investment projects in southern Italian regions. Since 
1994, under the new regional policy regime (Law 488), investment projects realised in 
several northern areas are also eligible for capital grants. 
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